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Abstract	
This	paper	charts	the	main	changes	in	security	industry	regulation	in	Australia	from	the	1980s	
to	 the	 present	 time,	 and	 provides	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 regulatory	 framework	 and	 the	 change	
process.	 Change	 has	 largely	 been	 driven	 by	 recurring	 conduct	 scandals,	 with	 governments	
obliged	to	 introduce	 increasingly	more	stringent	 integrity	checks	and	competency	standards	
in	 an	 attempt	 to	 diminish	 widespread	 concerns	 about	 the	 industry.	 Despite	 the	 lack	 of	
strategic	planning,	a	significant	learning	process	is	evident	and	a	clear	model	of	best	practice	
has	emerged.	Recent	enquiries	show	that	Australia	still	does	not	have	an	optimal	system	for	
managing	the	industry	but	change	has	been	in	the	right	direction,	with	scope	for	fine‐tuning	to	
ensure	more	responsive	and	effective	regulation.	
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Background	
Global	industry	growth	
The	growth	of	private	security	has	been	a	key	factor	behind	the	expansion	of	security	industry	
regulation.	As	more	and	more	people	have	come	into	contact	with	security	personnel	or	become	
dependent	 on	 security	 technology,	 there	 has	 been	 an	 increasing	 recognition	 of	 the	 need	 for	
better	management	of	these	encounters	and	relationships.	The	industry	came	to	prominence	in	
the	 1960s	 and	 1970s	 and	 grew	 rapidly,	 with	 reports	 indicating	 that	 security	 personnel	 now	
outnumber	police	by	two‐or‐more	to	one	in	many	countries,	including	the	United	States,	China,	
India	and	South	Africa	(Small	Arms	Survey	2011).	Elsewhere,	such	as	in	Europe,	private	security	
numbers	 have	 generally	 remained	 below	 those	 of	 police,	 although	 differential	 trends	 have	
favoured	growth	in	the	private	sector.	A	2011	survey	across	70	countries	estimated	there	were	
19.5	million	people	employed	in	private	security,	with	a	total	of	25.5	million	across	all	countries	
(Small	Arms	Survey	2011:	101‐106).	The	entire	industry	was	valued	at	$US100‐165	billion	per	
annum,	with	an	annual	 growth	 rate	of	7‐8	percent.	Across	 the	70	countries	 surveyed,	private	
security	personnel	were	estimated	to	outnumber	police	by	a	ratio	of	1.8:1.	In	Australia,	the	most	
recent	 study	 of	 the	 size	 of	 the	 industry	 estimated	 that,	 in	 the	 years	 2006‐08,	 there	 were	 on	
average	 45,000	 police	 and	 112,000	 licenced	 security	 providers	 although	 many	 security	
providers	were	part‐time	(Prenzler,	Earle	and	Sarre	2009).	
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Growth	in	private	security	has	been	attributed	to	a	wide	variety	of	factors	(Jones	and	Newburn	
2006;	 Shearing	 and	 Stenning	 1983).	 Deliberate	 policies	 of	 privatising	 policing	 have	 not	 been	
particularly	 significant.	 The	 main	 factor	 appears	 to	 be	 market	 demand,	 driven	 by	 the	 large	
increases	in	crime	from	the	1960s	through	to	the	turn	of	the	century.	Increasing	crime	has,	 in	
turn,	been	associated	with	 the	 increasing	prosperity	and	personal	mobility	 that	emerged	over	
this	period.	The	growth	of	‘mass	private	property’	venues,	such	as	shopping	centres	and	sports	
stadiums	was	another	factor	as	were	improvements	in	security	technology,	legislated	workplace	
safety	 standards,	 increased	 litigation	by	victims	of	 crime,	 and	 the	post‐Munich	and	post‐9/11	
terrorist	 threats.	 The	 current	 downward	 trend	 in	 crime,	 especially	 property	 crime,	 is	 also	
closely	 associated	with	 the	 uptake	 of	 security	 and	 continuous	 growth	 in	 the	 sector	 (van	Dijk	
2012).	
	
Misconduct	issues	
Industry	growth	led	to	the	increasing	exposure	of	clients	and	members	of	the	public	to	diverse	
forms	of	misconduct	by	security	providers	(George	and	Button	2000;	Johnston	1992;	Jones	and	
Newburn	 1998;	 Prenzler	 2004).	 Perhaps	 the	 most	 prominent	 example	 is	 violence	 and	
negligence	 by	 security	 staff	 at	 entertainment	 venues.	 The	 violence	 problem,	 more	 generally,	
includes	misuse	of	 firearms	and	other	weapons,	 including	guard	dogs.	 Insider	crime	has	been	
another	 feature	 of	 the	 emerging	 risk	profile	 of	 the	 industry	 along	with	 general	 incompetence	
and	 poor	 standards,	 including	 wasted	 police	 time	 responding	 to	 false	 alarms.	 The	 private	
inquiry	industry	has	also	been	subject	to	recurring	allegations	of	breaches	of	privacy.	
	
Like	 public	 policing,	 security	 has	 a	 risk	 profile	 that	 derives	 from	 the	 pressures	 and	
opportunities	inherent	in	the	work	and,	as	with	police,	governments	have	grudgingly	increased	
regulation	of	the	sector	(Prenzler	and	Sarre	2008).	There	have	also	been	efforts	by	professional	
security	 associations	 to	 address	 conduct	 issues	 through	 membership	 standards.	 However,	
associations	 usually	 have	 limited	 investigative	 capacity	 and	 limited	 reach	 through	 voluntary	
membership.	 ‘Regulation’	 has	 also	 occurred	 through	 criminal	 and	 civil	 law;	 employment,	 fair	
trading,	 privacy	 and	 weapons	 legislation;	 and	 the	 market	 itself.	 However,	 each	 of	 these	
mechanisms	is	limited	in	their	capacity	to	bring	offenders	to	justice	or	to	deter	misconduct	more	
generally	(Sarre	and	Prenzler	1999;	Stenning	2000).	
	
The	 main	 default	 position	 therefore	 has	 been	 for	 governments	 to	 legislate	 and	 administer	
occupational	 licensing	 regimes.	 These	 typically	 involve	 two	 main	 elements:	 certification	 of	
competency	through	minimum	training	requirements,	and	certification	of	integrity	through	the	
application	 of	 disqualifying	 offences	 and	 associated	 character	 checks	 (such	 as	 reference	
checking)	(Button	2012).	Licensing	systems	have	been	rolled	out	 internationally,	mainly	 from	
the	 1980s,	 with	 enormous	 variation	 in	 requirements,	 coverage	 of	 industry	 sub‐sectors,	 and	
levels	of	enforcement,	with	European	countries	evidencing	some	of	the	most	developed	systems	
(Button	2012).	Recently,	the	Confederation	of	European	Security	Services	(CoESS)	assessed	the	
level	of	‘strictness’	of	regulations	across	34	countries:	2	were	rated	as	‘low’,	8	as	‘medium’,	17	as	
‘strict’	and	6	as	‘very	strict’	(CoESS	2011:	150).	
	
The	first	wave	of	reform	
In	 Australia,	 regulation	 of	 the	 private	 security	 industry	 is	 the	 responsibility	 of	 states	 and	
territories.	 The	 first	 wave	 of	 industry‐specific	 regulation	 is	 associated	 with	 the	 New	 South	
Wales	Security	(Protection)	Industry	Act	1985,	which	introduced	licensing	of	security	firms	and	
employees.	Criteria	included	‘prescribed	qualifications	and	experience’	and	disqualification	for	
10	years	 for	offences	against	 the	Act	 and	 convictions	 for	 indictable	offences	 (s.10).	The	 focus	
was	 on	 guards,	 consultants	 and	 some	 classes	 of	 security	 equipment	 providers.	 The	 Police	
Service	administered	the	Act,	setting	training	standards	at	two	days,	with	firearms	accreditation	
after	one	day	of	 training	 (New	South	Wales	Police	 Service	1995:	 16).	Amendments	were	 also	
made	to	the	Commercial	Agents	and	Private	Inquiry	Agents	Act	1963,	including	requirements	for	
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qualifications	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	 an	 offence	 of	 harassment.	 The	 situation	 in	 New	 South	
Wales	 pre‐1985	 was	 similar	 across	 Australia,	 with	 tokenistic	 legislation	 focused	 on	 debt	
collectors,	process	servers,	private	investigators	and	some	classes	of	security	guards.	Obtaining	
a	licence	was	described	as	being:		
	
as	 simple	 as	 filling	 out	 a	 form,	 paying	 a	 fee,	 and	 taking	 it	 to	 the	 local	 licensing	
sergeant	...	after	which	you	could	strap	a	gun	to	your	hip	and	protect	premises,	go	
on	patrol	and	provide	cash	carrying	services.	(Cowan	2009:	77)	
	
Conduct	issues	
The	 introduction	 of	 industry‐specific	 regulation	 in	 Australia	 was	 driven	 by	 a	 diverse	 set	 of	
problems	 centred	 around	 competence	 and	misconduct,	 issues	 given	 increasing	 attention	by	 a	
critical	 media	 (Cowan	 2009).	 In	 New	 South	Wales,	 the	 new	 Act	 and	 the	 amendments	 to	 the	
Commercial	Agents	 and	 Private	 Inquiry	 Agents	 Act	were	 brought	 in	 as	 a	 package,	 along	 with	
amendments	 to	 the	 Firearms	 and	Dangerous	Weapons	 Act	 1973	 (Legislative	 Assembly	 1985:	
3636‐3658).	 The	 amendments	 to	 the	 Weapons	 Act	 were	 designed	 to	 improve	 gun	 control	
following	mounting	concerns	about	firearms	misuse.	These	concerns	were	brought	to	a	head	by	
the	1984	‘Milperra	Massacre’,	involving	a	shoot‐out	between	rival	motorcycle	gangs	in	a	public	
place.	 There	 were	 concerns	 that	 the	 original	 Act	 allowed	 security	 guards	 to	 carry	 guns	 on	
private	property	without	a	licence,	even	though	they	were	unable	to	use	the	weapon	for	defence	
outside	the	designated	property.	This	 issue	was	particularly	salient	 in	relation	to	the	need	for	
better	protection	against	armed	robberies.	The	situation	was	addressed	through	the	amended	
weapons	 legislation	 and	 the	new	 Security	 (Protection)	 Industry	Act	1985	by	 allowing	 licenced	
guards	 to	obtain	 a	weapons	 licence.	 In	 addition,	 an	 industrial	 dispute	 in	New	 South	Wales	 in	
1983	 brought	 to	 light	 the	 lack	 of	 training,	 supervision	 and	 safety	 standards	 in	 the	 industry.	
There	were	 also	 concerns	 about	 unethical	 conduct	 by	 commercial	 agents	 and	private	 inquiry	
agents	including	breaches	of	privacy,	stalking	and	harassment.	
	
Across	the	1980s	and	into	the	1990s,	the	industry	also	attracted	negative	publicity	over	violence	
associated	with	 crowd	 controllers	 at	 licenced	premises.	A	 crisis	 of	 sorts	 emerged	 in	 the	 late‐
1980s	 and	 early‐1990s	 in	 various	 parts	 of	 Australia.	 In	 1989,	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Queensland	
parliament	claimed	that	at	least	10	people	were	taken	to	hospital	each	week	because	of	assaults	
by	 venue	 staff.	 The	 Acting	 Premier	 described	 ‘“bully	 boy”	 bouncers’	 as	 ‘a	 growing	 menace’	
(quoted	 in	 Prenzler,	 Baxter	 and	 Draper	 1998:	 22).	 A	 variety	 of	 groups	 –	 including	 police,	
concerned	parents,	employers,	doctors	and	security	operators	–	 called	 for	better	controls	and	
training	 of	 crowd	 controllers	 (Prenzler	 et	 al.	 1998;	Queensland	 Parliamentary	Debates	 1993:	
6419).	 In	 the	 Australian	 Capital	 Territory	 a	 discussion	 paper	 described	 'serious	 problems'	
accompanying	 security	 industry	 growth,	 noting	 that	 'violence	 and	 allegations	 of	 criminal	
infiltration	have	dogged	the	industry'	(Attorney	General's	Department	1992:	i).		
	
In	Victoria,	the	problem	was	crystallised	in	a	report,	Inquiry	into	Violence	in	and	around	Licenced	
Premises,	by	the	Victorian	Community	Council	Against	Violence	(1990).	The	report	identified	a	
serious	 problem	 with	 harassment,	 fights	 and	 assaults	 around	 licenced	 premises.	 It	 was	
estimated	 that	about	20	per	 cent	of	 all	 reported	 serious	assaults	 in	 the	 state	were	associated	
with	 licenced	premises	 –	over	800	per	year.	The	 researchers	 surveyed	nightclub	patrons	and	
found	the	large	majority	had	witnessed	violence,	while	30	per	cent	claimed	to	have	been	victims	
of	 violence	 and	 37	 per	 cent	 of	 this	 group	 claimed	 the	 violence	 was	 perpetrated	 by	 crowd	
controllers.	 Deregulation	 of	 liquor	 licensing	 in	 1987	was	 identified	 as	 a	 key	 influence	 on	 the	
problem,	 with	 cheap‐drinks	 promotions	 and	 all‐night	 opening	 hours.	 Hotel	 and	 nightclub	
managers	were	 criticised	 for	permitting	or	 encouraging	 aggression	by	 crowd	 controllers.	The	
report	 found	 there	 were	 no	 training	 requirements	 or	 training	 standards,	 and	 that	 crowd	
controllers	were	frequently	victims	of	violence.		
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The	mid‐1990s	saw	a	number	of	exposés	of	fraud	by	security	providers	(Australian	Competition	
and	 Consumer	 Commission	 1996:	 42;	 Prenzler	 2004:	 286).	 In	 Queensland	 and	 New	 South	
Wales,	the	former	Trade	Practices	Commission	investigated	a	24‐hour	intruder	and	emergency	
alarm	 pendant	 system	 operated	 by	 Metropolitan	 Security	 Services.	 The	 ‘Neva	 Alone’	 system,	
designed	for	elderly	and	infirm	persons,	frequently	failed	to	activate	properly.	The	Commission	
also	 found	 that,	 at	 times,	 the	 control	 room	 was	 unstaffed.	 In	 Newcastle,	 whistle‐blowers	 at	
Chubb	revealed	that	data	readouts	on	patrol	checks	of	clients’	premises	were	being	falsified.	An	
Australian	Competition	and	Consumer	Commission	investigation	in	Perth	found	that	Wormald	
had	failed	 to	provide	adequate	mobile	patrol	checks.	 In	Brisbane,	an	undercover	 investigation	
by	 journalists	 led	 to	 the	 successful	 prosecution	 of	 Mayne	 Nickless	 for	 failing	 to	 provide	
contracted	security	checks	on	premises.		
	
Also	 in	 the	 mid‐1990s,	 in	 New	 South	 Wales,	 another	 enquiry	 was	 triggered	 by	 a	 variety	 of	
adverse	 incidents,	 including	 allegations	 of	 under‐award	 payments	 in	 the	 contract‐security	
industry.	 Chief	 Inspector	Wedderburn	 of	 the	New	 South	Wales	Police	 Service	 (1995:	 9)	 cited	
‘numerous	instances	of	malpractice	in	relation	to	the	exploitation	of	security	personnel’.	Labour	
costs	had	been	misrepresented	in	contracts,	and	some	employers	had	been	abusing	the	federal	
government’s	Job	Start	subsidy	system	by	terminating	employees	once	the	subsidy	expired.	The	
Wedderburn	 report	 also	 found	 that	 persons	 with	 criminal	 histories	 for	 burglary	 and	 armed	
robbery	 were	 being	 trained	 and	 licenced	 in	 alarm	 installation,	 including	 how	 to	 bypass	 or	
suppress	 security	 devices.	 One	 case	 was	 identified	 in	 which	 a	 court	 issued	 a	 security	 guard	
licence	 to	 a	 convicted	 armed	 robber	 on	 weekend	 detention.	 The	 use	 of	 firearms	 by	 security	
officers	continued	to	cause	concern.	Wedderburn	described	the	attitude	of	some	companies	to	
issuing	firearms	as	‘cavalier’,	and	cited	the	view	of	firearms	instructors	that	one	day	of	weapons	
instruction	was	‘totally	inadequate’	(1995:	iv	and	17).	The	overall	finding	was	that	it	was	still	far	
too	 easy	 to	 set	 up	 a	 security	 business	 or	 to	work	 as	 a	 security	 provider,	with	 only	 the	most	
minimal	requirements	and	checks,	many	of	which	could	be	easily	bypassed.		
	
New	 South	 Wales	 was	 also	 the	 site	 of	 a	 report	 by	 the	 Independent	 Commission	 Against	
Corruption	(1992)	which	found	that	private	investigators	were	brokering	an	extensive	trade	in	
confidential	 information,	estimated	 to	have	exceeded	$1	million	over	several	years.	Finally,	 in	
1995,	 shootings	 associated	 with	 armed	 robberies,	 including	 the	 shooting	 of	 two	 security	
officers,	 led	 to	 an	 Industrial	 Relations	 Commission	 (1997)	 enquiry	 into	 the	 cash‐in‐transit	
industry	in	New	South	Wales.	The	enquiry	found	that	the	licensing	system	had	failed	to	deliver	
appropriate	 training	 for	 guards	and	 to	 stop	 criminals	 entering	 the	 industry.	There	was	also	a	
negligent	approach,	the	enquiry	said,	to	deliveries	that	created	high	levels	of	risks	for	security	
officers	and	members	of	the	public.	
	
Regulatory	responses	
These	 cases	 and	 other	 incidents	 severely	 tarnished	 the	 image	 of	 the	 industry.	 In	 the	 media,	
terms	such	as	‘backyarders’,	‘cowboys’,	‘thugs’	and	‘criminals’	were	used	to	describe	sections	of	
the	industry	(see,	for	example,	Background	Briefing,	1995;	Wilson	1994).	There	were	increasing	
calls	for	more	effective	regulation.	Victoria	was	the	first	 ‘cab	off	the	rank’	in	responding	to	the	
problem.	The	1990	report	by	the	Victorian	Community	Council	Against	Violence	led	directly	to	
the	 Private	 Agents	 (Amendment)	 Act	 1990,	 which,	 in	 amending	 the	 Private	 Agents	 Act	 1966,	
introduced	 a	 specific	 training	 and	 licensing	 requirement	 for	 crowd	 controllers.	 The	 Act	 was	
attributed	 with	 producing	 major	 reductions	 in	 violence	 (Frost	 1991).	 Although	 the	 alleged	
positive	 impacts	were	not	well	 documented,	 the	Victorian	 legislation	became	a	model	Act	 for	
other	 jurisdictions	 (Department	 of	 Justice	 1993).	 The	Australian	 Capital	 Territory	 introduced	
regulation	of	industry	sectors	through	the	Fair	Trading	Act	1992,	and	Queensland	brought	in	the	
Security	Providers	Act	 in	1993.	These	were	then	 followed	by	 legislation	 in	South	Australia	and	
the	Northern	Territory	in	1995,	Western	Australia	in	1996,	and	New	South	Wales	in	1997.	Only	
Tasmania	maintained	earlier	legislation	confined	to	inquiry	agents	and	debt	collectors.	
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The	New	South	Wales	Security	Industry	Act	1997	included	a	range	of	improvements	(Legislative	
Assembly	 1997:	 2089‐2090).	 Criminal	 history	 checks	 were	 made	 compulsory	 before	 an	
applicant	 could	 enter	 into	 a	 training	 program,	 with	 regular	 checks	 to	 ensure	 currency.	
Disqualifications	 were	 permanent	 for	 persons	 convicted	 of	 robbery	 and	 firearms	 offences.	
Training	centres	were	subject	 to	approval	by	 the	Vocational	Education	Training	Accreditation	
Board	(VETAB).	The	new	Act	also	introduced	a	unique	form	of	‘co‐regulation’,	in	which	security	
firms	were	required	to	obtain	membership	in	professional	associations,	which	conducted	their	
own	compliance	reviews.	Firms	were	also	required	to	comply	with	standards	 in	areas	such	as	
insurance,	 industrial	 awards	 and	 a	 code	 of	 practice.	 A	 new	 civilian	 office	 within	 the	 Police	
Ministry	 was	 created	 to	 counter	 the	 alleged	 understaffing	 that	 had	 partly	 undermined	 the	
administration	 of	 the	 1984	 Act.	 These	 changes	 were	 triggered	 by	 the	 Wedderburn	 and	
Industrial	Relations	Commission	enquiries,	referred	to	above,	and	planning	 for	a	 large	private	
security	contribution	to	the	2000	Sydney	Olympic	Games.		
	
Table	1	shows	 the	situation	 in	1998	at	 the	end	of	 this	 first	period	of	major	 reform.	The	main	
elements	of	the	new	legislation	were	the	introduction	of	compulsory	pre‐employment	training	
and	disqualifying	offences	in	areas	such	as	theft,	fraud	and	violence.	Training	requirements	for	
guards	 and	 crowd	 controllers	 were	 highly	 variable.	 South	 Australia	 required	 12	 days;	 New	
South	Wales	six	days;	and	Queensland,	Western	Australia	and	the	Northern	Territory	required	
between	 3‐5	 days	 (Prenzler	 and	 Sarre	 1999:	 14).	 All	 jurisdictions	 licenced	 security	 firms,	
contract	 guards	 and	 crowd	 controllers,	 and	 all	 except	 the	 Northern	 Territory	 and	 Australian	
Capital	 Territory	 licenced	 inquiry	 agents.	 Beyond	 that,	 there	 were	 significant	 gaps	 and	
inconsistencies	 in	 relation	 to	 bodyguards,	 security	 consultants,	 control	 room	 operators,	
installers	 and	 repairers,	 and	 locksmiths	 and	 trainers.	 Only	 New	 South	 Wales	 and	 Western	
Australia	 had	 near	 complete	 coverage	 of	 all	 security	 occupations	 (Prenzler	 and	 Sarre	 1999).	
Administration	 of	 the	 legislation	was	 spread	 across	 police	 departments	 and	 consumer	 affairs	
divisions	within	justice	departments	around	the	nation.		
	
Table	1:	Regulatory	agencies	and	legislation,	1998:	The	first	wave	
Jurisdiction	 Unit	(Department)	 Main	Legislation	
Tasmania	 District	Headquarters	and	
Commissioner’s	Office	(Police)	
Commercial	and	Inquiry	Agents	
Act	1974	
Victoria	 Private	Agents	Registry	(Police) Private	Agents	(Amendment)	Act	
1990	
Australian	Capital	Territory	
	
Consumer	Affairs	(Justice) Fair	Trading	Act	1992	
Queensland	
	
Consumer	Affairs	(Justice) Security	Providers	Act	1993	
South	Australia	 Consumer	and	Business	Affairs	
(Justice)	
Security	and	Investigation	Agents	
Act	1995	
Northern	Territory	 Private	Security	Licensing	
Authority,	Consumer	Affairs	and	
Fair	Trading	(Justice)	
Private	Security	Act	1995	
Western	Australia	 Commercial	Agents	Squad	(Police) Security	and	Related	Activities	
(Control)	Act	1996	
New	South	Wales	
	
Security	Industry	Registry (Police) Security	Industry	Act	1997	
Source:	Adapted	from	Prenzler	and	Sarre	(1999:	9).	
	
The	second	wave	of	reform	
One	 of	 the	major	 drawbacks	 in	 the	 first	wave	 of	 regulatory	 reform	was	 that	measures	were	
never	developed	to	assess	the	impact	of	the	new	laws.	Therefore	there	was	little	evidence	about	
what	was	working	 and	what	 aspects	 of	 the	 system	needed	 improvement	 (Prenzler	 and	 Sarre	
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1999).	 However,	 the	 inadequacies	 of	 the	 new	 systems	 rapidly	 became	 apparent	 in	 a	 further	
series	of	scandals	and	exposés,	which	revealed	a	more	complex	and	problematic	picture	of	the	
industry.		
	
Conduct	issues	
Problems	associated	with	security	guards,	firearms	and	safety	continued	on	from	the	1990s	into	
the	 2000s.	 In	 1998,	 a	 shoot‐out	 between	 armed	 robbers	 and	 armoured	 car	 guards	 in	 a	 busy	
Brisbane	 street	 resulted	 in	 several	 injuries,	 including	 the	 permanent	 paralysis	 of	 a	 passer‐by	
(Prenzler	 2004:	 287‐288).	 In	 a	 similar	 incident	 in	Adelaide,	 in	 1987,	 a	 shopper	 in	 a	 crowded	
street	was	hit	by	a	bullet	 fired	by	a	security	guard	at	 intruders	(referred	to	 in	Sarre	1998).	 In	
New	 South	Wales,	 between	 2003	 and	 2005,	 there	were	 a	 number	 of	 thefts	 of	 firearms	 from	
security	guards	and	security	firm	premises.	In	one	three‐month	period,	56	firearms	were	stolen	
in	 six	 incidents	 (Duff	 2005).	 The	 firearms	 problem	 received	 national	 attention	 following	 an	
incident	in	Sydney	in	2004	when	a	cash‐in‐transit	guard,	who	had	been	seriously	assaulted,	shot	
dead	the	escaping	thief.	The	case	exposed	serious	shortcomings	in	unarmoured,	‘soft	skin’,	cash‐
in‐transit	operations	(O’Rourke	2004).	
	
The	problem	of	assaults	associated	with	licenced	premises	also	continued	to	grow.	In	Victoria,	
in	2004,	it	was	reported	that	over	50	persons	were	suing	security	providers	for	compensation	
for	injuries	that	included	fractured	skulls	and	broken	jaws	(Butler	and	Kelly	2004;	Owen‐Brown	
2004).	 The	 death	 of	 prominent	 cricketer	 and	 commentator	 David	 Hookes,	 following	 an	
altercation	 with	 a	 crowd	 controller,	 received	 enormous	 national	 media	 coverage	 (Sarre	 and	
Prenzler	 2009:	 128;	 Schwarz	 2006).	 In	 Adelaide,	 in	 a	 high	 profile	 case,	 five	 brothers	 sued	
security	 staff	 for	 assault	 after	 an	 incident	 in	 a	 shopping	 centre,	while	 the	Advertiser	 reported	
that	police	had	charged	87	bouncers	for	assault‐related	offences	over	a	two	year	period	(Hunt	
2004;	The	Advertiser	2004a).	A	report	by	the	Office	of	Consumer	and	Business	Affairs	(2004)	in	
South	 Australia	 identified	 a	 pattern	 in	 the	 violence,	 with	 the	 same	 venues	 and	 security	 staff	
consistently	 attracting	 allegations.	 The	 report	 cited	 the	 view	 of	 police	 that	 crowd	 controllers	
were	largely	responsible	for	the	violence.	Groups	including	the	Australian	Hoteliers	Association	
and	 Liquor,	 Hospitality	 and	 Miscellaneous	 Workers	 Union	 called	 for	 better	 regulation	 (The	
Advertiser	 2004b:	 26).	 In	 2003‐4,	 concerns	 about	 open	 warfare	 between	 outlaw	 motorcycle	
gangs	 on	 the	 streets	 of	 Adelaide	 also	 involved	 allegations	 that	 gangs	 were	 using	 nightclub	
security	to	sell	drugs,	launder	money	and	launch	gang	fights	(Kelton	2003;	Office	of	Consumer	
and	Business	Affairs	2004).		
	
In	1994,	the	Victorian	Deputy	Registrar	for	Private	Agents	claimed	that	security	firms:	
	
have	 very	poor	 selection	procedures.	They	 lack	any	 real	 supervisory	hierarchy.	
People	 are	 sent	 out	 on	 the	 job	 and	 not	 seen	 again	 until	 they	 return.	 There	 are	
extremely	poor	standards	in	respect	to	training.	(Private	Cops	1994)	
	
In	Western	Australia,	a	1997	review	of	intruder‐alarm	responses	revealed	that	police	attended	
an	average	of	900	false	alarm	calls	per	week,	with	a	 false	alarm	activation	rate	of	94	per	cent	
(Western	 Australia	 Police	 1997).	 In	 1999,	 the	 issue	 of	 insider	 crime	 was	 elevated	 by	 strong	
suspicions	around	one	of	the	guards	in	Australia’s	largest	armed	robbery	involving	theft	of	$2.2	
million	 from	a	Brinks	armoured	van	(Dibben	2000).	There	were	exposés	of	 lax	security	at	 the	
Australian	 Royal	 Mint	 and	 Parliament	 House	 Canberra	 (McManus	 2005;	 Campbell	 2006).	 In	
Perth,	 in	 2004,	 seven	 prisoners	 classed	 as	 ‘dangerous’	 overpowered	 three	 guards	 at	 the	
Supreme	Court	and	stole	a	key	which	allowed	them	to	escape	from	the	building	(Pennells	2004).	
They	 then	hijacked	 two	 vehicles,	 provoking	 a	massive	police	 search	 and	 a	high‐speed	vehicle	
pursuit	 which	 shut	 down	 a	 freeway.	 Transit	 security	 in	 Sydney	 came	 under	 a	 cloud	 in	 2005	
following	several	security	breaches	and	revelations	of	numerous	complaints	against	officers.	An	
enquiry	 by	 the	New	 South	Wales	Ombudsman	 found	officers	were	 exceeding	 their	 powers	 in	
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making	arrests	and	using	unjustifiable	force	(New	South	Wales	Ombudsman	2005:	69‐72).		
	
Further	 revelations	 of	 fraud	 and	 corruption	 in	 the	 industry	 were	 forthcoming.	 In	 Victoria,	 a	
major	 investigation	 –	 Operation	 BART	 –	 by	 the	 Victorian	 Ombudsman	 (1998)	 revealed	 a	
corruption	 network	 that	 operated	 over	 three	 decades	 involving	 security	 firms	 making	 cash	
payments	 to	 police	 to	 bypass	 an	 emergency	 security	 repair	 allocation	 system.	 In	 2004,	
Australia’s	largest	security	firm,	Chubb,	pleaded	guilty	in	the	Federal	Court	to	26	charges	that	it	
had	misrepresented	 its	ability	 to	 fulfil	 conditions	 in	 its	mobile	patrol	 contracts	 in	Sydney,	 the	
Central	Coast,	Canberra	and	Tasmania.	After	pleading	guilty,	the	company	was	fined	$1.5	million	
but	 kept	 its	 licence	 after	 agreeing	 to	 major	 internal	 reforms	 (Australian	 Competition	 and	
Consumer	Commission	2005:	47,	63,	129;	Wallace	2004).		
	
Further	scandal	followed	in	2005	when	a	review	of	airport	security	was	initiated	by	the	federal	
government	following	insider	allegations	of	lax	security	and	criminal	infiltration.	The	‘Wheeler	
Report’	 identified	major	 gaps	 in	Australia’s	 airport	 security	 system,	 including	 inadequacies	 in	
cargo	 screening,	 checks	 on	 staff,	 supervision,	 and	 coordination	 between	 public	 and	 private	
security	 providers	 (Wheeler	 2005).	 Apart	 from	 exposing	 airlines	 to	 terrorist	 attacks,	 the	
problems	 included	 trafficking	 in	 illicit	 goods,	 theft,	 and	 infiltration	by	organised	 crime.	 In	 the	
same	 year,	 an	 Australian	 National	 Audit	 Office	 (2005)	 report	 identified	 inadequacies	 in	
surveillance	and	screening	in	border	security,	especially	at	cargo	ports.	
	
Concerns	about	airport	and	seaport	security,	and	the	involvement	of	outlaw	motorcycle	gangs	in	
security,	 led	 to	 an	 Australian	 Crime	 Commission	 (ACC)	 ‘special	 intelligence	 operation’	 into	
criminal	infiltration	of	the	industry,	which	began	in	September	2007	and	was	completed	in	June	
2009	 (Australian	 Crime	 Commission	 2009:	 54).	 A	 major	 investigative	 process	 was	 launched	
which	 included	 undercover	 operations,	 interviews,	 advertising	 for	 submissions	 and	 data‐
mining.	The	Commission	found	that	‘the	vast	majority	of	companies	and	individuals	working	in	
the	private	security	industry	were	legitimate	and	provide	an	excellent	service	to	the	Australian	
community’	 (Australian	 Crime	 Commission	 2011:	 1).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 investigation	
identified	examples	from	across	the	country	of	organised	crime	figures	owning	security	firms	or	
‘bribing	or	corrupting	security	firms	or	employees’	(2011:	4).	Criminal	activity	included	‘fraud,	
property	 theft,	 illicit	 commodity	 distribution	 (such	 as	 drugs),	 money	 laundering,	 trespass,	
assault,	 misuse	 of	 firearms	 [and]	 extortion’	 (2011:	 4).	 The	 report	 also	 referred	 to	 the	 use	 of	
violence	and	intimidation	to	obtain	market	share,	and	a	significant	cash	economy	that	involved	
under‐award	payments,	tax	evasion,	welfare	fraud,	and	breaches	of	visa	conditions.	
	
At	the	same	time	that	the	ACC	enquiry	was	under	way,	two	other	major	investigations	into	the	
industry	 were	 launched.	 The	 New	 South	Wales	 Independent	 Commission	 Against	 Corruption	
(ICAC)	 began	 an	 investigation	 into	 security	 guard	 training	 –	Operation	Columba	 –	 in	October	
2008.	 Three	 Registered	 Training	 Organisations	 were	 found	 to	 have	 issued	 certificates	 to	
students	 in	 the	 two‐week	pre‐licence	 training	program	 ‘without	 requiring	 them	 to	attend	any	
classes	or	undertake	the	relevant	course’	(Independent	Commission	Against	Corruption	2009:	
17).	Records	of	attendance	were	falsified,	and	answers	were	provided	to	students	in	open‐book	
style	 examinations.	 Many	 of	 the	 graduates	 lacked	 adequate	 English.	 It	 was	 estimated	 that	
approximately	9,000	training	certificates	issued	over	several	years	were	tainted	by	fraud.	Cash	
payments	were	 also	 accepted	 for	 certificates	of	 First	Aid,	Responsible	 Service	 of	Alcohol,	 and	
Responsible	 Conduct	 of	 Gambling.	 The	 principal	 of	 one	 institute	was	 believed	 to	 have	 falsely	
obtained	at	least	$1.3	million	from	inappropriate	payments.	
	
The	ICAC	enquiry	overlapped	a	2009	audit	of	industry	labour	hire	practices	by	the	federal	Fair	
Work	 Ombudsman.	 Close	 auditing	 of	 256	 security	 employers	 found	 49	 per	 cent	 were	 non‐
compliant	with	 the	Fair	Work	Act.	Of	 these,	52	per	 cent	had	minor	contraventions	 relating	 to	
time	 and	 wage	 records	 and	 payslips;	 48	 per	 cent	 had	 monetary	 contraventions	 relating	 to	
underpayment	 of	 wages,	 penalty	 rates	 and	 allowances;	 and	 21	 per	 cent	 had	 both	 types	 of	
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contraventions	 (Fair	 Work	 Ombudsman	 2010:	 8).	 The	 main	 finding	 was	 that	 there	 was	 a	
widespread	illegal	practice	of	paying	discounted	‘flat	rates’,	especially	for	weekends,	shift	work	
and	overtime.	Approximately	$453,000	was	recovered	on	behalf	of	652	security	staff.	
	
Regulatory	responses	
The	 significant	 events	described	above	 triggered	a	 series	of	 amendments	 to	 security	 industry	
legislation	and	the	introduction	of	some	new	Acts.	In	Queensland,	the	Northern	Territory,	South	
Australia,	Western	Australia	and	New	South	Wales,	 the	 legislative	base	remained	as	 it	was,	as	
shown	 in	 Table	 1.	 The	 Australian	 Capital	 Territory	 enacted	 the	 Security	 Industry	 Act	 2003,	
Tasmania	the	Security	and	Investigations	Agents	Act	2002,	and	Victoria	the	Private	Security	Act	
2004.	The	changes	to	the	regulatory	framework	were	piecemeal	and	complex.	An	analysis	of	the	
main	elements	of	the	legislation	was	conducted	by	Sarre	and	Prenzler	(2011:	chapter	2),	and	is	
summarised	briefly	as	follows.	
	
In	terms	of	coverage	of	the	industry,	licensing	was	extended	to	almost	all	areas	of	security	work,	
including	 locksmiths,	consultants,	 in‐house	security	personnel,	 trainers,	and	electronic	system	
installers	and	monitors.	The	number	of	disqualifying	offences	was	also	enlarged	to	cover	areas	
such	as	firearms	offences	and	drug	offences.	Regulators	were	given	greater	powers	to	deny	or	
suspend	 licences	on	discretionary	grounds,	 including	evidence	of	poor	character	and	 criminal	
associates,	using	confidential	 intelligence,	without	the	need	to	provide	a	reason	in	some	cases	
(New	 South	 Wales	 and	 South	 Australia).	 Most	 jurisdictions	 also	 suspended	 licences	 when	 a	
licence	holder	was	charged	with	a	criminal	offence,	and	 licence	holders	were	also	required	 to	
inform	 the	 regulator	 if	 they	 had	 been	 charged.	 Mandatory	 fingerprinting	 allowed	 for	 more	
reliable	checks	on	criminal	histories.	
	
There	were	also	large	numbers	of	minor	changes	aimed	at	keeping	the	licensing	system	up‐to‐
date	and	improving	the	accountability	of	licence	holders.	These	covered	diverse	matters	such	as	
the	 requirement	 of	 the	 display	 of	 ID,	 keeping	 of	 records	 and	 recording	 incidents,	 and	 more	
frequent	inspections	of	security	firms	and	operatives.	There	were	associated	changes	in	liquor	
licence	regulations	in	some	jurisdictions	too,	focused	on	stipulated	ratios	of	crowd	controllers	to	
patrons,	 and	 powers	 to	 shut	 down	 premises	 with	 recurring	 problems	 of	 violence.	 South	
Australia	 and	 Western	 Australia	 introduced	 drug	 testing	 of	 crowd	 controllers,	 and	 South	
Australia	introduced	a	discretionary	power	to	order	applicants	or	licence	holders	to	undertake	a	
psychological	test.	
	
One	major	initiative	in	this	period	was	the	adoption	by	the	Council	of	Australian	Governments	
(COAG)	 of	 the	 issue	 of	 national	 consistency	 in	 regulation.	 In	 the	 post‐9/11	 security	
environment,	COAG	recognised	‘the	important	contribution	the	private	security	industry	makes	
in	 supporting	 Australia’s	 counter‐terrorism	 arrangements’	 (COAG	 2005:	 5).	 In	 an	 effort	 to	
improve	 standards,	 the	 Council	 commissioned	 a	 major	 report,	 published	 in	 2007,	 which	
recommended	 regulatory	 ‘harmonisation’	 (The	 CIE	 2007).	 The	 opportunity	 was,	 however,	
stymied	by	New	South	Wales	Premier	Morris	Iemma,	allegedly	because	it	would	entail	reducing	
standards	 in	 his	 state	 (Coorey	 2007).	 The	 only	 real	 progress	 occurred	 in	 training,	 with	 the	
introduction	 of	 nationally	 accredited	 certificate	 level	 courses	 in	 security.	 The	 new	 system	
provided	security	staff	with	a	basic	qualification,	more	consistency	in	curricula	(including	more	
attention	to	conflict	management,	communication	and	management	of	intoxicated	persons)	and	
legal	and	procedural	requirements.		
	
New	South	Wales	was	at	the	centre	of	the	problems	and	issues	described	above.	Major	changes	
were	made	 in	 2006	and	2012.	 The	Firearms	Regulation	2006	 included	greater	 restrictions	on	
security	firms	and	guards,	with	more	secure	storage	of	weapons	and	clearer	requirements	 for	
justifications	 for	 carrying	 firearms.	 The	 Security	 Industry	Amendment	Act	 2012	 was	 the	main	
vehicle	for	implementing	the	recommendations	of	the	ICAC	report.	The	regulator	–	the	Security	
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Industry	Registry	–	was	renamed	the	Security	Licensing	and	Enforcement	Directorate.	The	new	
‘SLED’	was	significantly	enlarged,	with	an	increase	in	allocated	staff	from	40	to	73.	It	was	placed	
under	the	direct	control	of	the	New	South	Wales	Police	Commissioner	through	the	State	Crime	
Command	 (Sexton	 2012;	 New	 South	 Wales	 Police	 Service	 2012).	 The	 revised	 Act	 required	
clearer	disclosures	by	security	firms	about	subcontracting,	and	gave	police	the	power	to	inspect	
security	firms	and	obtain	documents,	to	make	use	of	criminal	intelligence	in	licensing	decisions,	
and	to	set	training	standards.	The	reforms	also	entailed	the	abandonment	of	the	co‐regulatory	
system.	This	decision	was	based	on	an	unpublished	review	conducted	 for	 the	 government	by	
Deloitte	 (O’Malley	 2011).	 The	 restructure	 involved	 significant	 increases	 in	 licence	 fees	 to	
support	 the	 Deloitte	 recommendation	 for	 full	 industry	 funding	 of	 the	 enlarged	 regulator	 –	
estimated	to	cost	an	extra	$AU4.7	million	per	annum	(O’Malley	2011).	
	
In	a	parallel	development	to	regulatory	reform,	and	following	the	Wheeler	Review,	the	federal	
government	announced	$200	million	in	airport	security	upgrades.	The	plan	included	control	of	
security	 by	 Australian	 Federal	 Police	 at	 major	 airports,	 enhanced	 sharing	 of	 information	
between	 agencies,	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 investigation	 teams	 focused	 on	 organised	 crime.	 In	
addition,	fingerprinting	requirements	and	better	training	were	introduced	for	airport	staff,	with	
additional	screening	of	passengers	and	baggage,	increased	airside	perimeter	patrols,	and	wider	
CCTV	coverage	(Customs	2005;	Dodson	and	Wilkinson	2005).		
	
Critique	and	recommendations	
The	present	study	has	documented	diverse	and	recurring	problems	in	the	security	industry,	and	
belated	 and	 reactive	 reform	 efforts	 by	 Australian	 state,	 territory	 and	 federal	 governments.	
Although	governments	are	frequently	accused	of	‘over‐regulation’,	this	has	not	been	the	case	in	
relation	to	the	security	industry,	where	‘under‐regulation’	has	been	the	norm,	except	perhaps	in	
the	 area	 of	 excessive	 licence	 fees	 (O’Malley	 2011).	 There	 is	 little	 doubt	 that	 Australia’s	
continuing	 faith	 in	 the	 regulatory	 powers	 of	 the	 market,	 in	 combination	 with	 a	 simple	
government	 licence	scheme,	 led	 to	 repeated	cases	of	 regulatory	 failure.	 Scandals	and	exposés	
precipitated	 a	 series	 of	 enquiries	 across	 the	 1990s	 and	 2000s,	 culminating	 in	 three	 major	
enquiries	between	2007	and	2009.	The	enquiries	by	the	Australian	Crime	Commission,	the	Fair	
Work	 Ombudsman	 and	 the	 New	 South	 Wales	 Independent	 Commission	 Against	 Corruption	
were	unprecedented	in	their	scope	and	resourcing,	and	in	the	range	of	investigative	techniques	
they	 deployed.	 The	ACC	 investigation	was	 the	 largest	 enquiry	 into	 the	 industry	 in	Australia’s	
history,	with	a	special	 federal	budget	allocation	of	$8.7	million	(Australian	Crime	Commission	
2008:	56).	All	three	enquiries	found	extensive	and	entrenched	forms	of	misconduct	in	key	parts	
of	the	industry.	
	
The	problems	revealed	by	all	these	enquiries	–	from	the	1980s	to	the	2000s	–	were	not	unique	
to	 Australia.	 They	 are	 common	 throughout	 the	 industry,	 especially	 in	 the	 less	 regulated	
jurisdictions	internationally	(Button	and	George	2006;	Panorama	2008).	They	evince	a	standard	
set	 of	 misconduct	 risks.	 Not	 unlike	 what	 happened	 in	 many	 other	 jurisdictions,	 Australian	
governments	 repeatedly	 failed	 to	 heed	 warnings	 about	 these	 risks	 from	 the	 industry	
associations.	They	also	 failed	 to	adopt	a	best	practice	model	of	 regulation	set	out	by	 industry	
associations	 and	 academics,	 based	 on	 insider	 knowledge	 and	 international	 research	 about	
required	competencies	and	the	risk	profile	of	the	industry	(for	example,	Button	2012;	Prenzler	
and	 Sarre	 2008;	 South	 1983;	 Stenning	 2000).	 Overarching	 the	 failure	 of	 regulatory	 systems	
were	critical	failures	of	consultation	and	accountability.	
	
Aspects	 of	 the	most	 recent	 investigations	 and	 regulatory	 changes	were	 also	 characterised	 by	
inadequate	 accountability,	 transparency	 and	 consultation,	 and	 failure	 to	 engage	 with	 a	 clear	
national	 model.	 The	 ACC	 investigation	 resulted	 in	 a	 highly	 cut‐down	 report	 for	 public	
consumption,	with	no	details	on	outcomes	in	terms	of	prosecutions	and	convictions	or	the	exact	
nature	of	the	promised	enhanced	surveillance	of	 the	 industry	by	policing	agencies	(Australian	
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Crime	Commission	2011).	The	abandonment	of	 the	co‐regulatory	system	 in	New	South	Wales	
also	 evidenced	 secrecy	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 consultation	 (O’Malley	 2011).	 While	 the	 ICAC	 report	
criticised	 aspects	 of	 the	 co‐regulatory	 arrangement,	 there	was	 no	 recommendation	 to	 shut	 it	
down.	 Elsewhere,	 changes	were	 generally	 introduced	with	 little	 or	 no	 consultation	 or	 proper	
research.	 The	 most	 recent	 reform	 process	 in	 Queensland	 was	 something	 of	 an	 exception	 in	
terms	 of	 systematic	 stakeholder	 consultation	 (Office	 of	 Fair	 Trading	 2005).	 However,	 the	
activities	and	impacts	of	the	regulator	remain	largely	a	closed	book.	
	
The	 Fair	Work	 Ombudsman	 and	 ICAC	 enquiries	 showed	 a	 little	 more	 promise	 in	 terms	 of	 a	
commitment	 to	 monitoring	 the	 industry.	 In	 2011,	 the	 Ombudsman	 launched	 the	 National	
Security	Service	Industry	Follow	Up	Campaign	2011.	A	2012	report	 found,	 from	392	completed	
audits,	 that	 75.3	 per	 cent	 of	 employers	were	 compliant,	 while	 97	 employers	 (24.7	 per	 cent)	
were	 non‐compliant	 (Fair	 Work	 Ombudsman	 2012:	 6).	 At	 the	 time	 of	 reporting,	 the	 2011	
campaign	 had	 led	 to	 $427,158	 in	wages	 and	 entitlements	 being	 recovered	 for	 658	 staff.	 The	
report	warned,	however,	that	the	compliance	rate	was	likely	to	decrease,	with	only	42	ongoing	
investigations	 into	 suspected	 non‐compliance.	 In	 2011,	 the	 ICAC	 conducted	 an	 assessment	 of	
the	 implementation	 of	 the	 16	 recommendations	 from	 Operation	 Columba,	 which	 found	 that	
most	 had	 been	 implemented	 as	 prescribed	 (Independent	 Commission	 Against	 Corruption	
2011).		
	
The	 area	 of	 training	 generally	 provides	 grounds	 for	 ongoing	 concern.	 There	 is	 no	 legislative	
requirement	for	public	disclosures	of	training	methods	and	quality	control.	In	that	regard,	a	key	
regulatory	 task	 of	 reassuring	 consumers	 about	 the	 competency	 of	 security	 providers	 has	 not	
been	realised.	The	national	certificate	requirements	represent	a	major	step	forward,	but	these	
are	 limited	 to	 operatives,	 with	 no	 requirements	 for	 the	 holder	 of	 a	 company	 licence	 or	
government	security	managers	to	have	training.	In	Queensland,	as	one	example	of	an	anomaly,	
it	is	possible	to	obtain	a	security	consultant	licence	without	undertaking	any	training	(Office	of	
Fair	 Trading	 2012).	 Indeed,	 the	 ease	 with	 which	 a	 person	 can	 obtain	 a	 security	 licence	 in	
Queensland	(along	with	allegations	that	the	assignment	answers	are	provided	by	one	less	than	
reputable	training	agency)	was	highlighted	in	a	media	report	recently	(Harvey	2012).	
	
Outside	 basic	 training	 requirements,	 national	 consistency	 remains	 as	 elusive	 as	 ever,	 despite	
decades	 of	 lobbying	 by	 the	 industry.	 Significant	 differences	 remain	 between	 jurisdictions,	
including	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 licence	 categories,	 terminology	 and	 fees.	 Differences	 also	 remain	 in	
areas	such	as	drug	and	alcohol	tests,	disqualifying	offences	and	disqualifying	periods,	criminal	
history	checks,	‘fit	and	proper’	tests,	‘close	associate’	checks,	testing	for	drugs	and	alcohol,	and	
controls	 on	 firearms.	 There	 are	 also	 differences	 in	 the	 roles	 of	 stakeholders	 on	 regulator	
advisory	boards,	and	the	use	of	enforceable	codes	of	conduct.	As	an	example	of	the	way	in	which	
the	jurisdictions	essentially	go	their	own	way,	the	New	South	Wales	model	of	co‐regulation	was	
adopted	in	Queensland	around	the	same	time	it	was	abandoned	in	New	South	Wales.		
	
In	2010,	a	nationwide	survey	of	security	firm	owners	and	security	managers	found	very	mixed	
views	on	regulation	(Sarre	and	Prenzler	2011:	55‐75).	When	asked	about	pre‐licence	training,	a	
majority	felt	that	courses	were	adequate	in	the	areas	of	knowledge	of	 law	(60	per	cent),	basic	
security	procedures	(83	per	cent)	and	occupational	health	and	safety	(78	per	cent).	However,	
training	 was	 considered	 inadequate	 in	 developing	 skills	 in	 communication	 (73	 per	 cent),	
conflict	resolution	(69	per	cent),	physical	restraint	(69	per	cent)	and	self‐defence	(75	per	cent).	
In	addition,	59	per	cent	 thought	 that	 the	 system	 in	 their	 jurisdiction	was	highly	 ineffective	 in	
‘removing	disreputable	operators	from	the	industry’,	and	67	per	cent	felt	that	compliance	with	
legislation	was	not	effectively	monitored	(2011:	57,	74).	
	
This	 paper	 has	 focused	 upon	 security	 industry	 regulation	 but	 it	 has	 also	 documented	 how	
regulation	is	not	unrelated	to	airport	and	seaport	security.	Furthermore,	implementation	of	the	
Wheeler	reforms	has	been	problematic.	In	2008	accusations	surfaced	that	the	full	complement	
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of	 airport	 police	 had	 not	 been	 reached	 and	 many	 of	 the	 security	 upgrades	 had	 only	 been	
partially	implemented	(O’Brien	and	Wilson	2008).	Similar	problems	of	 inadequate	checking	of	
goods	 and	 vetting	 of	 staff	 at	 seaports	 were	 identified	 by	 Customs’	 Director	 of	 National	
Intelligence	and	Targeting,	in	testimony	before	a	parliamentary	committee	(Maley	2008).	
	
However,	 the	most	concerning	 issue	 for	 the	 industry	remains	 that	of	violence	associated	with	
crowd	controllers	in	and	around	licenced	premises.	The	problem	has	never	been	systematically	
addressed	 at	 the	 national	 level,	 despite	 almost	 continuous	 media	 coverage	 and	 alarm	 over	
violent	incidents	(for	example,	Carson	2011;	Newcastle	Herald	2012;	O’Malley	2011).	
	
Reform	of	crowd	control	and	liquor	licensing	needs	to	tie	in	with	the	more	complete	adoption	of	
principles	 of	 ‘responsive	 regulation’	 and	 ‘smart	 regulation’	 (Ayres	 and	 Braithwaite	 1992;	
Gunningham	and	Grabosky	1998).	 There	needs	 to	 be	more	 research	 conducted	by	 regulators	
that	 includes	 consultation	 with	 practitioners	 about	 their	 needs.	 Standard	 performance	
measures	 need	 to	 be	 developed	 and	 routinely	 reported	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 complaints,	
prosecutions	and	public	experiences	to	gauge	the	impacts	of	regulatory	strategies,	and	to	make	
modifications	where	 necessary.	 A	 range	 of	 advanced	 investigative	 techniques,	 some	 of	which	
were	adopted	by	 the	more	recent	enquiries,	also	needs	 to	be	adopted	as	standard	practice	by	
the	 regulators	 including	 surveillance,	 covert	 operations,	 application	 of	 listening	 devices,	 and	
compulsory	 hearings.	 One	 way	 of	 moving	 this	 forward	 is	 for	 the	 federal	 Attorney‐General’s	
Department	to	take	a	more	proactive	role	in	coordinating	the	development	of	a	model	Act	and	
regulations,	which	all	 jurisdictions	could	adopt	through	the	COAG	process.	The	salience	of	 the	
industry	provides	a	strong	justification	for	the	creation	of	a	small	unit	in	the	Department	to	have	
a	research	and	monitoring	role,	and	to	promote	a	nationally	consistent	approach	towards	best	
practice	regulation.		
	
Conclusion	
Security	industry	regulation	in	Australia	evolved	via	a	piecemeal	process	which	has	been	largely	
crisis‐driven	and	reactive.	Revelations	of	recurring	and	diverse	forms	of	misconduct	 triggered	
various	regulatory	‘fixes’,	which	have	proved	to	be	inadequate,	necessitating	further	attempts	to	
halt	 damaging	 and	 embarrassing	 scandals.	 The	 current	 system	 represents	 a	 significant	
improvement	from	the	1980s,	when	 industry‐specific	 legislation	was	first	 introduced.	Persons	
wishing	 to	 work	 in	 the	 industry	 now	 face	 a	 range	 of	 competency	 and	 integrity	 checks	 that	
provide	 at	 least	 a	 minimal	 underwriting	 of	 standards	 by	 government.	 From	 a	 national	
perspective,	however,	the	system	remains	fragmentary,	and	there	is	little	evidence	of	consistent	
improvements	 in	the	 industry.	 It	 is	clear	 that	a	much	more	proactive	approach	 is	needed	that	
involves	a	mix	of	legislation	and	regulatory	strategies	designed	to	produce	quality	outcomes	in	
the	delivery	of	vital	security	and	safety	services.	
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